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Faulty No-Fault: Let the Consumer Beware
William Schwartz*
I. "Faulty" Versus "Faultless" No-Fault
No-fault is not necessarily an idea whose time has come. Rather, it is a
confusing, misleading, and popularly promoted label which has been affixed
to numerous proposals and plans. Over one hundred proposals and plans
have been given the appellation of no-fault. Some of these proposals may
be marked more by their differences than their similarities. Thus, the no-
fault label has the inherent capacity of deceiving an uninformed public.
It is a dramatic illustration of the power of a sonorous phrase to command
uncritical acceptance.
The only feature common to all types of no-fault plans is their provision
for recovery by an injured auto accident victim of some of his medical ex-
penses and some of his wage losses without proving that a defendant driver
was at fault. The various no-fault plans do differ radically in their treat-
ment of the important general damages which an injured person suffers as
a result of an accident.
By the common law, it is axiomatic that in personal injury cases, a plain-
tiff is entitled to compensation for his entire loss-his loss of wages, med-
ical expenses, and what are known as "general damages".' Among the gen-
eral damages recoverable by accident victims are damages for disability to
body or mind; pain and suffering, including worry, embarrassment, humili-
ation and inability to enjoy life; disfigurement; loss of vision or hearing; loss
of earning capacity or ability; and loss of comfort, society, and guidance
from a relative who has been wrongfully killed.
* Professor of Law, Boston University. A.M., J.D., Boston University. Formerly
General Director, The Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
1. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 88 (1935); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.10, at 1321-23 (1956); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 905, 924 (1939); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF
TORTS 141-145 (James Supp. 1968); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1959); Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in
Personal Injury Litigation, 1962 DUKE L.J. 344 (1962).
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Some of the no-fault plans, usually referred to as "total" no-fault plans,
completely eliminate the right to sue in tort to recover general damages.
Others, based upon the Massachusetts approach, 2 allow recovery only if the
injured person's medical expenses exceed a given amount ($500 in Massa-
chusetts). In addition, this type of plan also allows recovery in the cases of
certain specified types of injuries. Thus, in Massachusetts, the right to sue in
tort and to recover general damages is sanctioned if the injuries involve one
of the following unrelated categories: (1) death, (2) permanent serious
disfigurement, (3) deafness or blindness, (4) dismemberment, or (5) any
fracture.
Another type of no-fault proposal does not eliminate the right to sue in
tort, but limits the amount an injured person can recover for general dam-
ages by using a formula involving medical expenses. For example, under an
Illinois statute,3 which has been declared unconstitutional, 4 the recovery for
general damages would usually be limited to 50 percent of the medical ex-
penses; provided that the medical expenses did not exceed $500., If the
medical expenses exceeded $500, recovery would be limited to $250 plus an
amount equal to the expenses in excess of $500. For example, if the medi-
cal expenses were $700, an accident victim could not recover more than
$450 for general damages.
It is submitted that the aforementioned types of no-fault plans, and vari-
ations thereon, should be characterized as "faulty" no-fault plans. They
seek to achieve the advantages of no-fault at a terrible and unnecessary
price. These "faulty" no-fault plans needlessly either eliminate or limit
compensation for general damages. Such plans affront the common law man-
date that the dignity and human losses of men are compensable.
Faulty no-fault plans eliminate or limit the right to recover for general
damages by placing the highest priority on the payment of economic losses
to both the deserving accident victims - who would have recovered under the
fault system - and the undeserving accident victims (those whom the fault
system classified as "wrong-doers" or as presenting unmeritorious claims
2. See Act of Aug. 13, 1970, ch. 670, § 4 (1970) Mass. Acts & Resolves 529.
Other recent statutes modeled after and similar to that of Massachusetts are: N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39:6A-1-39, 6A-18; Ch. 71-252 (1971) Fla. Acts 993; P.A. 273 (1972) Conn.
Acts 567. See also Mich. Public Acts of 1972, Act No. 294 permitting tort recovery
for general damages only in the cases of death, serious impairment of body function
and permanent serious disfigurement. As this article goes to press, New York, Colorado
and Utah have passed laws modeled after the Massachusetts statute.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.158 (Supp. 1972).
4. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
5. ILL. REV. STAT., supra note 3, at (c). The limitation on general damages is
inoperative in the following cases: death, dismemberment, permanent total or perma-
nent partial disability and permanent serious disfigurement,
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within the framework of the common law) who would not have recovered
under the fault system. These "faulty" no-fault plans proceed on the thesis
that it is not economically feasible to pay economic loss benefits to both
deserving and undeserving accident victims unless restrictions are placed on
the right of the deserving accident victim to recover general damages. This
subsidizing of the wrongdoer and the unmeritorious claimant at the expense
of the deserving accident victim results in the loss of the right to individual
justice.
It is possible to have both "butter and guns" in this field of the law. Ore-
gon,6 Delaware, 7 Maryland, 8 South Dakota, 9 and Arkansas10 have enacted
6. ORE REV. STAT. § 743.786 (1971), amending ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.786
(1967). The Oregon plan requires the inclusion in policies sold of coverage which
provides for the payment (on a first-party no-fault basis) of benefits for medical ex-
penses and wage losses. The medical benefits are limited to $3,000 per person and
the wage loss benefits (which exclude the first 14 days of disability from coverage)
are limited to 70% of the loss of income from work. The work loss benefits need
not exceed $500 per month or be paid for a period exceeding 52 weeks. In other
words, the maximum benefits payable under the Oregon law are approximately $9,000.
The liberal maximum no-fault benefits available in Oregon ($9,000) and Delaware
($10,000) are far superior to the limited benefits available in Massachusetts ($2,000).
Despite the provision in Delaware and Oregon for such extensive maximum benefits,
neither state abrogates the tort remedy. Despite the retention of the tort remedy,
overall premiums have not increased in states with such statutes. The availability of
first-party no-fault benefits has resulted in a claims decline in both states. Proponents
of the Oregon plan have informed me that there is a claims reduction of at least 30%.
7. 58 Laws of Del., ch. 98 (1971). Under this law, a $10,000 economic loss
package (first-party no-fault coverage) is provided every motorist on a compulsory
basis. Victims may recover either wage losses or medical expenses or both without
any ceiling, provided the aggregate recovery does not exceed the $10,000. Under
the Delaware plan, special damages incurred by the victim may not be pleaded or
proved in evidence (unless they exceed the $10,000 coverage available on a first-party
basis). In other words, the claimant may only prove and make claim for the value of
all non-economic loss plus economic loss exceeding the $10,000. Proponents of the
Delaware plan have informed me it has resulted in a claims reduction of about 42%.
The Delaware statute does not abrogate the right to recover for general damages.
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B (1972), amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 234B (1970). The Maryland plan provides a $2,500 first-party no-fault package for
medical expenses and wage losses. Similar to Delaware, the Maryland plan for
economic benefits does not provide inner limits. In other words, the victim can draw
money for either medical expenses or wage losses without limitation so long as the
total benefits claimed do not exceed $2,500 in the aggregate. According to the De-
partment of Transportation studies, a $2,500 economic loss package will pay the
economic losses of 96% of all auto accident victims. This would be payment in full
to that number of victims. The Maryland plan does not provide any limitation on tort
recovery. It also prohibits the insurer who pays first-party no-fault benefits from
claiming a right of subrogation based upon the fault of another person in causing the
accident. In my opinion, based on results in other states providing economic loss
benefits, the Maryland bill, which will go into effect in January, 1973, should result
in a reduction of claims and no additional premium cost to the owner of the vehicle.
In other words, savings from voluntary reduction in claims will be sufficient to offset
any additional costs for the $2,500 package.
Another excellent feature of the Maryland statute is its treatment of the problem
of the availability of insurance. It creates a state fund to provide liability insurance
[Vol. 22:746
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constructive no-fault laws which preserve the right to recover general dam-
ages. These laws provide for the prompt payment of medical expenses and
wage losses to accident victims, without the necessity of proving fault. The
maximum benefits payable in Oregon and Delaware are approximately five
times greater than the benefits available under the "faulty" Massachusetts no-
fault law. Oregon, Delaware, Maryland, South Dakota, and Arkansas give
their citizens the prompt payment of economic losses to which they are en-
titled, without creating a situation in which irresponsibility becomes eco-
nomically advantageous at the same time. In short, such plans eliminate the
problem of delayed payment, while preserving the public's right to collect
for all of their injuries.
Despite the preservation of the right to recover general damages in these
five states, experience reveals that over-all premiums for auto insurance
will not necessarily increase. The availability of first-party no-fault bene-
fits for economic loss will tend to reduce the number of claims for general
damages, 1 ' especially in the smaller cases. On the other hand, in a subsequent
for those who have been rejected for auto liability insurance by at least two private
insurers or who have had an auto liability insurance policy cancelled, for any reason
other than the non-payment of premiums. The insurance policy issued by the state
fund will also provide the first-party no-fault coverage and collision coverage.
9. S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 58-23-7 (Supp. 1972). In South Dakota, each in-
sured is given the freedom of choice of electing first-party no-fault coverage for
medical expenses and wage losses. Insurers are required to offer insureds (who have
the right to reject such coverage in writing) at least $2,000 medical expenses coverage
and work loss benefits of at least $60 per week for 52 weeks. The offer of work loss
coverage cannot exclude more than the first 14 days of disability. The right to sue in
tort is not affected. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B, 26 (Supp. 1972).
10. Act 138, State of Arkansas, 69th General Assembly, Regular Session, 1973.
The no-fault benefits provided are $2,000 of medical expense benefits and income dis-
ability benefits covering 70 percent of the loss of income during a period commencing
eight days after the date of the accident (not to exceed 52 weeks and subject to a
maximum of $140 per week). The named insured has the right to reject the no-fault
coverage. The tort remedy is preserved, and the Act is appropriately entitled "An
Act to Provide Freedom of Choice No-Fault Insurance."
11. Writing in TRIAL MAGAZINE, March/April, 1973 at 53, the Delaware In-
surance Commissioner reported:
Delaware's compulsory no-fault automobile insurance was one year old on
January 1, 1973, and it is a success. More people are being paid more
promptly and more equitably than ever before.
No-fault means that people are paid directly by their own insurer and with-
out waiting to determine who caused the collision. In Delaware, for over a
year now, there has not been a single known incident where the Delaware
victims were not paid promptly on presentation of their bills and the vehicle
was insured, as required by law.
Heart-rendering stories of accident victims with large medical expenses
and no income, waiting for insurance money (that in many cases never
came) are a thing of the past. The total absence of this type of complaint
makes it difficult to recall that it was the primary reason for the passage of
the law in the first place.
Litigation over medicals, wages and loss of services has also disappeared
1973]
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portion of this article, we will document and demonstrate that the overall
costs of auto insurance can and did incerase under a "faulty" no-fault
plan.
In addition to eliminating or limiting the right to recover for general dam-
ages, "faulty" no-fault plans suffer from numerous other deficiencies which
will be detailed in Part III of the article.
H. The Truth About Tort
For centuries, tort law has been a major guardian of the institutions which are
central to our civilization. The moment two men co-existed in the world,
the creation of a law of torts became imperative as an alternative to anar-
chy (no law) and tyranny (one-man or one-group rule). In the modern
world, the law of torts serves to stabilize society by balancing, with a mini-
mum of friction, competing social and individual interests through rules
based on reason and tested by experience. 1 2
In light of its central importance to society and its evolutionary develop-
except for out-of-state vehicle drivers and their passengers. Law firms and
insurance companies report amazing reduction in bodily injury suits arising out
of collisions occurring since 1972. No suits have been litigated as a result
of accidents since January 1, 1972, yet 13 months later, less than a dozen
suits have been filed by Delawareans. Best estimates indicate 70 percent
reduction in suits.
This reduction is accomplished with no formal threshhold. The only lim-
itation on suit is the prohibition against pleading of specials as a measure of
damages.
The personal injury limits of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident
also contributes to the absence of litigation.
This success is achieved with no increase in rate level. No one in Dela-
ware has paid more in his total insurance premium unless he has a change
of classification or an increase in coverage-many have paid less.
Bodily injury rates were reduced as much as 25 percent by bureau com-
panies and the average rate-level reduction in bodily injury for all companies
writing in Delaware was 8.5 percent statewide at date of inception.
For the first time in memory, no auto insurance rate-level changes have
occurred in 20 months and none are applied for or anticipated.
Historically, Delaware has had lower rates than surrounding states and
lower rates than most states east of the Mississippi River. Therefore, drama-
tic reductions were not anticipated. Our purpose was to assure that injuries
be paid for, and in that, the law is successful. We hoped for a slower degree
of increase in rates-in total they have gone down.
Delaware's no-fault auto insurance is working and can well serve as a na-
tional model.
12. See Pound, Reparation and Prevention in the Law of Today, 12 NACCA L.J.
197 (1953); Pound, Modern Trends in Tort Law, 16 NACCA L.J. 21 (1955). Simi-
larly, Dean Prosser has stated: "In any society, it is inevitable that these interests
shall come into conflict. When they do, the primitive man determines who shall
prevail with sword and club and tomahawk; and there is recent melancholy evidence
that the law of the jungle is not yet departed from the affairs of nations. But in a
civilized community, it is the law which is called upon to act as arbiter." W.L.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 15 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 22: 746
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ment through the centuries, a heavy burden of proof should be cast upon
those who would seek to alter substantially this element of civilization by
abrogating valuable, traditional and cherished fundamental rights. In mak-
ing this assertion, is not contended that the present system is perfect. On the
other hand, it is not necessary to burn down the barn merely to get rid of a
few mice.' 1
Yet, the common law system is currently beleaguered by its critics. These
criticisms are either unjustified or do not warrant the adoption of "faulty"
no-fault plans which would destroy the fundamental rights of accident vic-
tims to recover for all of their human losses. The following represent the
major criticisms which have been made of the fault system and this author's
responses.
A. Delay
Contrary to popular belief, there is not excessive delay in settling claims.
A study14 conducted by the Department of Transportation shows that an
overwhelming majority-76 percent-of auto accident claims are settled in
less than six months after the accident. Prompt and automatic payment
of benefits for economic losses can be as effectively achieved by the adop-
tion of the constructive reforms which have been implemented in Maryland,
Oregon, South Dakota, Arkansas and Delaware, as by a faulty no-fault plan.
While it takes longer to settle cases involving serious injury and injuries
to minors, this delay is in the victim's interest, since doctors must be able to
examine and treat such patients in order to determine the nature and extent
of loss. In such cases, medical costs and wage losses are sometimes unas-
certainable until many months after an accident. In the case of minors,
the full extent of their injuries are sometimes not apparent until much later. "
No-fault will not cure delay. In order to be paid by a no-fault insurance
policy, the victim must, of course, prove to the insurer's satisfaction that the
claimed injury was caused by the accident. The insurance company can
argue that the injuries were wholly or partly caused by another accident or
a fall, and not honor the claim. Then the victim would have to sue the in-
surer for the no-fault benefits.
Likewise, the amount of damages must be proven to the satisfaction of
13. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 613 (1971) (Tauro, C.J., concurring
opinion).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 84
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS].
15. See Friedman, No-Fault Automobile Insurance-A Premature Destruction of the
Tort Liability Reparations System in Automobile Accident Cases, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW.
542 (1971).
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the insurance company before the victim can recover. If the insurance com-
pany doctors disagree with the victim's personal physician, again, he would
have to sue the insurance company to recover his no-fault benefits.
The Opinion Research Poll of accident victims in Massachusetts revealed
that about a third of the claims which are more than six months old are still
unsettled despite the enactment of no-fault. 10 A recently published study
of the Institute of Judicial Administration reveals that no-fault has not as yet
had a recognizable impact on the speed with which personal injury cases
come to trial.' 7
B. Adequacy of Compensation
Some deserving accident victims do not receive full compensation under the
fault system primarily because of low insurance limits. 18 The most fre-
quently found coverage limit for automobile bodily injury liability insurance
is $10,000/$20,000. As the Department of Transportation has pointed out,
"since recovery under the tort system is virtually dependent on the avail-
ability of insurance, low coverage limits are tantamount to low recovery po-
tential for the victim."' 9 Another hurdle to recovery noted by the Department
involved uninsured motorists, since uninsured motorists coverage usually
limits recovery to the amount stipulated in minimum financial responsibility
laws.20
Accident victims are also denied adequate compensation because of the
presence of harsh and outmoded legal rules (i.e. contributory negligence, 2'
the immunities, and guest statutes), which have been vigorously promoted
by the insurance industry, one of the leading proponents of no-fault laws.
The tort system is not intended to compensate everyone. The system is
based upon the principle that one who wrongfully causes injury to another
should fairly and adequately compensate the injured person to the extent he
was free from fault. The tort system is operating as intended. It is not de-
signed to compensate persons who cause accidents. Such persons should
only recover under their own accident and health policies. 22
16. See Boston Globe, Jan. 4, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
17. FLA. B.J. 525 (October, 1972).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR
COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (1970).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Heft & Heft, The Two Lawyer Cake: No-Fault & Comparative Negligence,
58 A.B.A.J. 933 (1972) (urging the preservation of the tort system and the adoption
of comparative negligence coupled with first party no-fault coverage for economic
losses).
22. See generally, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARA-
TION: THIS ROAD TOWARD REFORM Vol. 1969 (No. 12, 1970).
[Vol. 22:746
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In addition, the tort system is not intended to be the only source of com-
pensation. There are other sources of reparations including medical insur-
ance, workmen's compensation, sick leave and social security benefits. The
victim's inability to recover fully may be attributable to deficiencies in these
other systems. 23
Are some victims undercompensated, while others are overcompen-
sated? According to a study conducted by the Department of Transporta-
tion, the minute number (one-half percent) of accident victims with losses
over $10,000 (who allegedly are undercompensated) receive more than seven
percent of the dollars paid out in benefits, and over 90 percent of the per-
sons in this category do receive some benefits. In contrast, only 70 percent
of those with economic losses of less than $500 receive benefits. 24  This
group, which constitutes almost 80 percent of the accident victims, receives
only 30 percent of the payment dollars. 25 Approximately 90 percent of the
victims suffer economic losses of $1,000 or less. 26  32 percent of this
group recovers less than half of its economic losses. 27 This is hardly the
picture of rampant overcompensation. Further, about nine out of ten
fatally or seriously injured victims obtain some compensation from at least
one reparation source.2 8
The more serious case certainly will be undercompensated by faulty no-
fault because such a case involves serious disability to body or mind; se-
vere pain and suffering; loss of earning ability; and in death cases, loss of
companionship, comfort, and society. Under faulty no-fault, these dam-
ages are either totally eliminated or curtailed.
The contention that the smaller claims are overcompensated is based, at
least in part, on the fallacious assumption that there is an automatic correla-
tion between the amount of economic loss and the consequent indirect or
psychic loss. In cooperation with the Department of Transportation, the
23. U.S. DEP'T. OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT INJURIES 43-46 (1970). [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES]
Thus, this study reveals that although 61 percent of the victims suffered some wage
losses, only 18 percent benefited from sick leave, 7 percent from workmen's compen-
sation, 2 percent from Social Security disability and 3 percent from Survivors and
other future Social Security benefits. Id. at 44. Only 37 percent of the total medical
expenses was recovered from hospital or medical insurance. Only 9 percent of the
wage loss was collected from sick leave. Id. at 46. The study further revealed that
those receiving tort reparations obtained about 60 percent of their total recovery from
the tort source. Id. at 47. A Michigan study corroborates this finding. See A.
CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ, R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS
AND PAYMENTS 66 (1964).
24. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 38.
25. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 50.
26. Id.
27. See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES at 42.
28. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 43.
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Closed Claims subcommittee of the Insurance Advisory Committee (including
the ten largest automobile volume company groups in the country) con-
ducted a survey. The survey concluded that there was no such correlation.
It found that:
The particular injury involved, the occupation of the injured, the
economic stratum in which he exists, may all have a bearing by
varying degree on the indirect damage segment of the loss. Thresh-
olds of pain and tolerance thereto differ in individuals just as does
the psychic impact and residual of injury. These relationships
must be valued in each particular case and the absence or presence
of indirect elements of damage are matters of widely varying de-
gree. 20
C. Efficiency
Although the accident victim receives 100 percent of the benefits paid out,
critics have alleged that he receives only 44 cents of the premium dollar he
has paid. Even if true, this rate of return is better than that which has been
experienced in Massachusetts under no-fault, as will be demonstrated in part
IV below.
In addition, recent studies of collision insurance and workmen's compen-
sation, which are both no-fault systems, fail to show any appreciable dif-
ference in efficiency between those systems and the fault system.30
Only six percent of the total auto insurance dollar goes to plaintiffs' lawyers.
A far larger proportion of the premium dollar is allocated to brokers' com-
missions, salaries of insurance officials, and other insurance company ex-
penses. 3 1 Under no-fault, money will still be paid out for these purposes.
Further, even more may be paid to investigators because it may be easier to
make a fraudulent claim, since under certain no-fault plans one need not
prove the car was in motion. If an injured person can connect his injury in
any way, to a car, he will be able to recover. Query: how many slips and
falls on a driveway or walk will become auto accidents under no-fault?
D. Congestion
Surveys demonstrate that such congestion and delay are problems limited
to a small number of metropolitan areas.3 2 Thus, the Institute for Judicial
29. Id. at 113.
30. See, e.g., Legislature of the State of Hawaii, Report on the Study of Hawaii's
Motor Vehicle Insurance Program, Special Report No. 72-1, at 42 (1972).
31. Hart Committee Study, WHERE YOUR AUTO INSURANCE PREMIUMS WENT-1959
To 1968 (1970).
32. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RESPONSIBLE REFORM, A PROGRAM TO
IMPROVE THE ]LIABILITY REPARATIONS SYSTEM VOL. 1969, at 14 (No. 8, 1970).
[Vol. 22:746
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Administration of New York University reports that the average period of
time between the ready date and trial is 5.2 months in Iowa; 3 months in
New Hampshire; 7 months in Kansas; and 8.7 months in Miami, Florida. Fur-
thermore, the average period of time between the service of answer and trial
is 6 months in Knox County, Tennessee; 5.2 months in South Dakota; 8.8
months in Portland, Oregon; 5.6 months in Oklahoma; 5.7 months in North
Dakota; and 11.4 months in Miami, Florida. 33
Is the fault system a major source of court congestion? Although 4.4 mil-
lion people are injured in auto accidents each year, only 220,000 auto ac-
cident lawsuits are filed. Only one-third of one percent of these injuries ever
reaches a final verdict and judgment, and these lawsuits consume only 17
percent of our total court resources.3 4  The real congestion is on the
criminal side, where courts spend about three times as much time to protect
the individual rights of criminals. It is perfectly proper to use a third as
much time to determine the rights of 100 million people who drive 100 mil-
lion vehicles a trillion miles a year. 35 Taken as a whole, criminal cases, land
damage, zoning, equity, contract, administrative law and other cases that are
not connected with auto accidents occupy the major share of the court's
time.36 This conclusion is substantiated by the Department of Transportation
study which attributed such delay to the following two factors: (1) delay
in filing lawsuits, this being strongly influenced by the local statute of lim-
itations; and (2) urbanization which results in more criminal and other
types of civil cases.3 7
The determination of fault is a relatively simple matter and does not
augment court congestion. A recent study made by an insurance company
proved that in 90 percent of all auto accidents, fault could be easily deter-
mined-usually from only the facts contained in the accident report.
3 8
E. Cancellations
The conception that the fault system causes the problem of cancellations is
simply not true. The problem of arbitrary cancellations and non-renew-
als of policies results from bad insurance company practices.3 9  Although
33. INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY 1971 (1972).
34. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LITIGATION 8-9 (1970).
35. Statement by Craig Spangenberg, Hearings Before Senate Committee on Com-
merce, 63-64 (Oct. 13, 1971).
36. See Letter from Chief Justice Tauro (of the Mass. Sup. Crt.) to Governs'-
Francis W. Sargent, Aug. 19, 1970. Reprinted 6 TRIAL 48 (Oct./Nov. 1970).
37. Supra note 33, at 8.
38. See Marryott, Testing the Criticisms of the Fault Concept, 35 INS. COUNSEL
J. 112 (1968).
39. See, e.g., The Story of Non-Renewal of One Auto Insurance Policy, Hearings
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some no-fault plans contain provisions designed to eliminate this evil, these
provisions could be adopted just as well under the tort system.40
F. Costs
Even the concept that insurance costs are excessive cannot be supported
statistically. A Department of Transportation study revealed that 72 per-
cent of the public paid less than $75 annually for automobile bodily injury
and property damage insurance premiums. 41
The cost of hospital care, medical treatment, automobile repairs, and the
average hourly wage-all of which make up the typical automobile
accident claim-have increased rapidly in recent years. It is not the legal
system of handling auto claims which has caused an increase in premiums,
but rather the general inflationary trend. During a ten-year period, auto
liability premiums went up at approximately the same rate as the consumer
price index, and during a twenty year interval, the portion of indivudal in-
come spent for auto liability insurance actually dropped!42  Auto body re-
pair costs and hospital charges are rising faster than auto insurance rates. 43
Two-thirds of the premium dollar pays for damage to the automobile it-
self.44  The most effective method of reducing premiums is to make ve-
hicles safer and more durable. A strong bumper protection law, which re-
quires "bumpers to bump and fenders to fend" would reduce physical dam-
age by 60 to 85 percent. 45
Costs may increase under no-fault because of the greater potentiality for
fraud. The fault system does not encourage fraudulent and excessive claims
when contrasted with no-fault insurance which offers greater temptation
for the dishonest since it removes the requirement of giving proof of fault
and forsakes current legal safeguards against fraudulent claims. Accidents,
such as falls on sidewalks, can be easily disguised as auto accident claims un-
der no-fault, if the plan does not require that the vehicle be in motion.
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9633 (1969).
40. Friedman, supra note 15, at 553. The Maryland statute, discussed supra note 8,
illustrates that it is feasible to treat the problem of cancellations and non-renewals
without impairing the tort remedy.
41. Derived from, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, PRICE VARIABILITY IN THE AUTro-
MOBILE INSURANCE MARKET 36 (1970).
42. Martin, Morality and the Fault System, 40 Miss. L.J. 485, 488 (1969).
43. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS-1970, at 286, 289
(1970); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMERS PRICE INDEX 5, 15 (Mar., 1971).
44. See Ghiardi & Kirchner, Automobile Insurance: The Rockefeller-Stewart Plan,
37 INS. COUNSEL J. 324, 326 (1970).




No-fault would not affect significant economics in claim processing nor
would it necessarily solve the problem of complexities in the claim process-
ing. There will still be a necessity of proving the occurrence of an acci-
dent, damages, and a causal connection between the accident and the damages
suffered. Claims under no-fault may involve "significant variables, such as
the extent of rehabilitation and recovery, and the like. Even explaining
how the figures are computed to the average claimant would be a difficult
task .. . . 46
III. The Faults in No-Fault
Faulty no-fault plans abrogate or restrict the right of a deserving accident
victim to recover all of his losses. In addition, no-fault plans are replete
with numerous other deficiencies and differ in their treatment of problem
areas. Hence, it is necessary to carefully evaluate each plan and to gauge
the extent to which it rectifies or avoids each of these shortcomings of no-
fault. In this part, the major "faults in no-fault" will be pinpointed.
Faulty no-fault plans provide the same compensation for the wrongdoer
and the unmeritorious claimant as the innocent, deserving victim. The ben-
efits paid to the wrongdoers and the unmeritorious are financed by either
eliminating or sharply reducing the right of the innocent deserving accident
victim to recover general damages.
Faulty no-fault plans will destroy the rights of and inadequately compen-
sate more than 90 percent of the accident victims entitled to recovery accord-
ing to statistics compiled by the Department of Transportation. 47 That study
reveals that the denial of general damages under faulty no-fault plans will
have the following deleterious effects on deserving accident victims:
(1) 78.9 percent of these accident victims will lose 78 percent of
their current benefits;
(2) 10 percent of these accident victims will lose 62 percent of
their current benefits;
(3) 4 percent of these accident victims will lose 59 percent of
their current benefits;
(4) 3.2 percent of these accident victims will lose 50 percent of
their current benefits;
(5) 2.3 percent of these accident victims will lose 38 percent of
their current benefits.
(6) 1.1 percent of these accident victims will lose 9 percent of
their current benefits.
46. See J. KEMPER, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 104 (1968).
47. See PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 50; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 47.
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The Department of Transportation statistics may well be conservative in
their estimated reduction of benefits under no-fault. A recent study by the
Jury Verdict Research Project reveals that in an average no-fault case in which
damages for pain and suffering are denied, an injured person could expect
to receive only 15.8 percent of what a jury would have awarded. 48
No-fault may increase the cost of insurance. Since no-fault would com-
pensate many who were not paid before-namely, those who were wrong-
doers or deemed unmeritorious by the common law-there could be an in-
crease in the number of claims made. Estimates as to increased claims
vary from 40 percent to 200 percent. 49 It is also possible that fraud in con-
cealing benefits from other sources and the making of payments periodically
(rather than in a simple lump sum) will place a heavy burden on insurance
companies and increase administration and investigation costs. In addition,
the likelihood of fraud is inherent in those no-fault plans which do not re-
quire a showing that the car was in motion at the time of the injury.
Certain administrative and legal expenses must necessarily be incurred
even under no-fault. Expenditures of time and money will be required to
show a causal connection between the accident and the alleged injuries suf-
fered and to prove the accident and the injuries. Further, it is quite difficult
to assume that the insurer's attitude will be marked by a spirit of benefi-
cence. Insurers can and may dispute claims under the no-fault coverage
which could breed costly and time consuming litigation.
A six month study conducted by the American Mutual Insurance Alli-
ance to determine the cost of a total no-fault plan forecast an increase of 29
percent in automobile insurance premiums under such a proposal.50 The
National Association of Independent Insurers recently made an actuarial anal-
ysis of the Hart-Magnuson national no-fault bill and projected that substan-
tial increases would result under that bill, with increases as large as 61 per-
cent in some states.
A no-fault plan which would provide no-fault benefits to cover every-
one's economic losses in full would result in an increase in premiums of at
least 75 percent.51 According to the Department of Transportation, the com-
pensable, economic loss-medical losses, wage losses, and incidental related
48. Jury Verdict Research Project, 6 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK (No.
131, 1972).
49. See Bailey, Fallacies Over-Sh'adow Validity of Plan's Cost Estimates, 3 TRIAL
45, 46 (Oct./Nov. 1967).
50. See Comment, Actuarial Study Challenges No-Fault Cost Savings, 10 FOR THE
DEFENSE 43 (June, 1969).




expenses-was $5,689,000,000 in 1967.52 The total premiums for all bod-
ily injury coverage in 1967 was $4,991,133,000.11 If, as proponents
claim, it should be assumed that the maximum achievable pay-out efficiency
of a no-fault plan is 65 percent pay-out and 35 percent administrative ex-
penses then it would have required total bodily injury premiums (at 1967 ex-
pense levels) of $8,750,000,000-a 75 percent increase in premiums-to
make those payments.
In part IV of this article, it will be documented that the overall costs of
insurance have risen in Massachusetts despite no-fault and that no-fault
has resulted in an increase in the true costs of insurance.
Many no-fault plans adversely affect segments of sociely
The following anticipated examples illustrate the inequities and injustices of
many no-fault plans:
1. Senior Citizens. A retired senior citizen is injured in an auto acci-
dent. Medicare pays his medical expenses. The accident changes his whole
life style, filling his retirement with grief, pain and unhappiness. Many no-
fault plans will prevent him from receiving a cent from any insurance com-
pany for his injuries and from suing the wrongdoer.
2. Housewives. A housewife, the mother of three children, is injured in
an auto accident caused by a reckless driver. She sustains a severe strain
of her neck and back muscles and (during the next five years) is forced to
perform her household duties in excruciating pain. Her medical expenses
are $150. Many no-fault plans prohibit her from receiving more than $150
from anyone.
3. Youth. A college student's arm is injured in an auto accident, and he
is deprived of his planned future as a surgeon. His medical bills are $300.
Many no-fault plans would limit his recovery to that amount.
4. Workers. A union worker suffers a herniated disc of his spine and fu-
sion of his back and neck as a result of an auto accident. A wage contin-
uation plan and an accident and health plan, both diligently negotiated for
by his local union, pay his medical expenses and wages. Under many no-
fault plans, he may not receive a single cent from any auto insurance com-
pany for his injuries and cannot sue the wrongdoer who caused the acci-
dent.
Discrimination and faulty no-fault plans
Faulty no-fault plans force the public to buy additional insurance to cover
52. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 18, at 6.
53. Supra note 51.
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the benefits taken away from accident victims. This cost will be high for
the average consumer and prohibitive for the poor. Illinois' no-fault law
was recently ruled unconstitutional. One of the bases of the trial court's
decision was that, since 4 out of every 5 members of low-income minority
families in Chicago either own no car or drive an uninsured one, they would
receive no benefits under the Illinois no-fault law5 4 Despite the unavailabil-
ity of no-fault benefits to the poor, the statute still restricted the rights of the
members of this class to recover general damages. 5
Accident victims in lower economic brackets typically incur substantial
lower medical expenses than the wealthy for the same ailment. Some
faulty no-fault plans use medical expense formulas which would permit the
wealthy to recover for a given injury, and deny recovery to the poor. A
54. Grace v. Howlett, CH 4737 (Ch. No. 71, Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill., 1972).
The court's memorandum opinion appears at: 1972 INs. L.J. 59 (Jan. 1972); 8 TRJAL
10 (Jan./Feb., 1972).
The Illinois statute provided first-party no-fault coverage for medical expenses and
wage losses. Medical expenses were subject to a limit of $2,000 per person. Wage
loss benefits covered 85 percent of the income lost as a result of total disability subject
to a limit of $150 per week for 52 weeks per person. Insurance was not made com-
pulsory (but the aforementioned coverages had to be included in each policy issued).
Thus, poor persons would not be entitled to any of the first-party benefits given to
those who could afford to purchase such coverage.
The statute did not abrogate totally the right to sue in tort. Rather, it imposed
limitations on the amount which could be recovered for pain and suffering. This
limitation was based on a medical expense formula. Recovery was limited to 50 per-
cent of the reasonable medical treatment expense to the extent that such expenses did
not exceed $500. Recovery was limited to 100 percent of such medical expenses to
the extent that such expenses exceeded $500. In other words, if the medical expenses
were $1,000, recovery could not exceed $750. The limitation on recovery did not
apply in cases of death, dismemberment, permanent total or permanent partial dis-
ability and permanent serious disfigurement.
In the Grace case, the trial judge held that the statute was "discrimination of the
rankest kind." The finding of unconstitutionality was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court.
All threshhold bills are subject to the same criticism. They discriminate against
the poor because it is well known that the medical expenses of the poor are lower
than the rich. A poor person would require a more serious injury than the affluent
in order to reach the medical threshhold upon which his recovery is predicated.
The trial court in Grace also pointed out that hospital and medical costs varied sub-
stantially throughout the state and within many single communities and areas.
55. The evidence introduced in Grace revealed that the damages of 94.6 percent of
all automobile accident victims would be limited by the statute. 47.3 percent of all
accident victims would be eligible for a maximum of only $50 in general damages.
Another 37.8 percent would be limited to a claim that would range from $50 to $150.
An additional 4.7 percent would be limited in their recovery to a sum ranging from
$150 to $250. Thus, about 90 percent of all automobile accident victims could re-
cover less than $250 through a tort action. In order to recover these comparatively
small sums, a claimant would still be required to establish negligence and his freedom
from contributory negligence under traditional tort concepts. Thus, upon application
of the statutory formula, the damages recoverable in 90 percent of all motor vehicle
accident cases would not economically permit the filing of a law suit. See Def. Ex.
5; Record, Grace v. Howlett, CH 4737 at 298.
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judge has described this as the "rankest discrimination." 56
While a so-called total no-fault plan may not be subject to this same con-
stitutional criticism since it destroys everyone's right to recover general dam-
ages, such an "even handed" abrogation of the rights of all of our citizenry
is obviously not in the public interest.
Faulty no-fault plans discriminate against persons earning less than $22,-
000 per annum. Some faulty no-fault plans limit recovery of wage losses to
a maximum of 85 percent of the accident victim's earnings. The 15 per-
cent reduction attempts to recognize that a claimant's recovery is not sub-
ject to income taxation. This is grossly unfair to people in lower income
brackets. Based on 1971 federal income tax rates, a married man with 3
children, using the standard deduction, would not pay 15 percent of his
earnings as taxes unless he earned at least $22,000 per year.
Faulty no-fault plans invade the accident victim's privacy. Some no-fault
plans authorize a deduction for income taxes from the benefits paid. This
compels the victim to disclose to the insurance company all of his confi-
dential financial information, including earned and unearned income, so
the company can compute the victim's tax bracket and its impact on the no-
fault benefits payable.
Faulty no-fault plans destroy fundamental concepts of personal security
and bodily integrity. These plans impair the right to recover for such hu-
man losses as disability, enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, and earning
capacity. In the case of death, such plans bar recovery for grief and the
loss of companionship, society, comfort and guidance.
Faulty no-fault leads to inequitable and discriminatory rates since faulty
no-fault plans set premium rates based upon the amount of injury or
damage suffered, rather than caused. The biggest risk to an insurer is the
party likely to sustain the most damage. In establishing rates, the insurance
company is no longer primarily concerned with whether the insured is a good
or poor driver. Thus, the highest premiums will be paid by the prudent
and responsible family man and the cheapest rate by the unemployed "hot
rodder". 57 A further inequity results if there is no requirement that there
be established a higher premium classification for larger commercial vehi-
cles in accordance with their higher injury causing propensities. The lack
of such requirement will force all other motorists to pay higher premiums to
absorb the amounts that are no longer being paid by such larger commercial
operators.
No-fault requires people to buy unneeded additional health and disabil-
56. Supra note 53.
57. Semerad, Assumptions vs. Facts, 6 T iAL 15, 19 (Oct./Nov., 1970).
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ity insurance. The overwhelming majority - more than 80 percent - do not
need this protection because they already have no-fault insurance in the form
of labor benefits, Blue Cross, medicare, and similar insurance.58
Faulty no-fault takes away hard-earned fringe benefits in that many of
the no-fault plans require that medical expenses and wage losses be paid
first out of other sources-such as other accident and health insurance,
Blue Cross, and wage continuation plans-before there is reimbursement
under the no-fault policy. 9 This is unjust to the worker who will have his
hard-earned fringe benefits taken away by no-fault insurance.
No-fault fails to treat the real problem-rising property damage costs. Two-
thirds of the cost of automobile insurance premium covers damage to the au-
tomobile. 60 Most no-fault plans do not provide methods of reducing the
costs of property damage to the automobile. The only reliable method of
reducing premiums is to compel manufacturers to produce safer and more
durable cars, and to implement a stringent safety program which reduces the
frequency of accidents.
Faulty no-fault puts the accident victim at the mercy of an insurance com-
pany. Some of the leading proponents of no-fault are openly seeking to
limit the attorney's role. Under the fault system, the attorney acts as a buf-
fer to protect the injured victim against the power of the insurance company.
Studies reveal that the outcome in a case where there is a lawyer is likely
to be more favorable to the victim than where there is no lawyer.6 ' At
least 54 percent of all automobile accident cases are settled without law-
yers. 6 2  Generally, lawyers are used only when injured persons cannot
themselves obtain an adequate settlement from an insurance company.
No-fault will increase auto accidents. The present system acts as a de-
terrent to the reckless driver. He knows that if he causes an accident, his
insurance rates will go up or his policy will be cancelled. In contrast, no-
fault removes this deterrent. The guilty driver will be rewarded, rather
than penalized, for his wrongdoing. In this age of carnage on our high-
ways, faulty and drunken driving should be penalized, not excused.
The deterrent effect of a tort judgment is not undercut by the presence
of liability insurance which shelters tortfeasors from bearing the economic
consequences of accidents.0 3  The existence of liability insurance itself
58. See 117 Cong. Rec. S. 3754 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1971).
59. See e.g., the Massachusetts statute, supra note 2, under which the no-fault
benefits must be reduced by benefits payable under wage continuation plans.
60. Ghiardi & Kirchner, supra note 44 at 324-26.
61. See H.L. Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT 193-94 (1970).
62. See PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 73.
63. Making this assertion are: Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern
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demonstrates acceptance of the concept of individual responsibility. Under
the fault system, careless driving is deterred by an increase in insurance
costs.
6 4
This view is substantiated by a study conducted for the Department of
Transportation wherein the researchers conclude:
We have seen that a relatively small proportion of the total buyer
market produces highly abnormal claims frequencies. There is
evidence that they are heavily involved in the large-loss accident
and that they contribute to the total actual loss from automobile
accidents out of all proportion to their numbers. In the interest
of loss control and prevention, this high-risk group must be iden-
tified and treated before the accidents occur. To this end, the
probabilities of loss causation must somehow be related to buyer
classifications. To ignore fault is to ignore causation. The best
way to reduce the high-risk insurers problem is to reduce the
number of high-risk drivers. The present law and underwriting
place strong economic pressure on high-risk buyers, a pressure
which would be released by a non-fault system.65
The insurance market does offer extensive no-fault coverage without de-
priving the victims of the right to recover general damages through private
companies. Faulty no-fault plans extract an unnecessary price, in light of
the practice of some carriers to offer extensive no-fault coverage under the
tort system. Under a plan embraced by one carrier, an injured victim can
recover $7,800 in income disability benefits and $2,500 in medical indem-
nity benefits from his own insurance company without proving fault. This is
certainly more extensive than the benefits available under the Massachusetts
plan. Despite the increases in benefits, the policyholder still retains his right
to sue a third party for damages. This coverage costs a nominal flat fee-
ranging between $4 and $8- over and above the cost of $2,000 medical
payments coverage which must be carried. 60
Some faulty no-fault plans determine fault in a proceeding at which
the driver is not present, represented or given an opportunity to be heard.
As an example, in Massachusetts, 67 fault is not actually eliminated. To
the extent that so-called first-party no-fault benefits are paid to an injured
victim, the carrier making such payments is subrogated to the rights of
Tort Law?, 53 VA. L. REV. 886, 889-90 (1967); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774, 781 (1967).
64. See Friedman, supra note 15 at 548.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, PRICE VARIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE IN-
SURANCE MARKET 144 (1970) (emphasis added).
66. Brief for Plaintiff at 26, Grace v. Howlett (Chancery Court, No. 71, Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois, 1972).
67. Act of Aug. 13, 1970, ch. 670, § 4 (1970) Mass. Acts & Resolves 529.
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the victim and it may sue the tortfeasor and will be reimbursed by the tort-
feasor if fault is shown. Under some of these plans, this process of sub-
rogation, based upon the fault principle, is to be effectuated between insur-
ers by arbitration. The fault of a driver will be determined in a proceeding
at which he is not present, represented, or given an opportunity to be heard.
The unfairness becomes even more apparent when rates are assessed.
Presumably, these subrogation proceedings will be used as a basis for as-
certaining bad risks and assessing rates.
Furthermore, faulty no-fault plans abrogate the innocent accident vic-
tim's right to recover for damages to his auto. If an innocent accident vic-
tim's car is damaged, his right to recover for damages to the vehicle from the
other driver who caused the accident is destroyed. The innocent accident
victim will have to buy collision insurance to protect himself from the
damages caused by the other driver. If this collision insurance policy has a
$100 deductible, the innocent accident victim will not be able to recover
the first $100 of damages from his own company or from the other driver.
Under the tort system, he could recover the $100 from the other driver.
A big price is also paid by the consumer in high deductibles and lengthy
waiting periods. Under some no-fault plans the consumer will either re-
ceive no benefits or reduced benefits because the plan either requires or en-
courages him to elect a high deductible or a lengthy period of exclusion
from the coverage.
The Opinion Research poll of accident victims revealed that 25 percent of
the accident victims lost more than two weeks from their jobs.6 8 This means
that 75 percent of the accident victims will not receive a cent of disability
benefits from the no-fault coverage if the plan excludes the first two weeks of
disability from the no-fault coverage.
Many institutional lenders who finance the purchase of automobiles
may find higher deductibles unattractive. This would be true if there is a
marginal buyer and would be intensified in the case of low down pay-
ment auto sales. Low income groups, and particularly minority groups, might
find their ability to purchase an auto inhibited by a mandatory large de-
ductible.
Another obvious deficiency of higher deductibles is that it might encour-
age the motivation of insured and repair shop interests to "pad" damage es-
timates in order to recover deductible amounts.
68. What Massachusetts Accident Victims Say About No-Fault Insurance 6 (De-





James Kemper, Jr., President of Kemper Insurance Group has said that "a
decline in the share of the automobile insurance market and underwriting
losses by a group of insurance companies provided strong motivation for
these companies to seek any solution, however radical, to escape from a des-
perate and deteriorating situation."' 69  Therefore, the insurance industry's
self-serving purposes have motivated no-fault. State Farm Insurance Com-
pany recently submitted a questionnaire to its policyholders to test public
preference between fault and no-fault insurance. Of the over three mil-
lion tabulated responses, 94 percent favored retaining the fault system.
70
The Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, is one of
the largest, oldest and most respected polling organizations in America.
71
Its poll of no-fault accident victims in Massachusetts reveals that the over-
whelming majority of accident victims consider no-fault unfair. 72
69. See J. KEMPER, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: THE POLITICS OF SURRENDER 9-10
(1968).
70. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1969, at 41, col. 1.
71. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 75, col. 1.
72. See Editorial, Stop, Look, and Listen-There's A Powerful Case Against No-
Fault, Barron's, Jan. 17, 1972, at 7, col. 1. The following is the News Release (un-
dated) of the Opinion Research Corporation concerning its study of Massachusetts
accident victims:
Princeton, N.J.: Among 502 Massachusetts automobile accident victims, of
whom 414 were injured during the first year that Massachusetts' no-fault
insurance law has been in effect, 62 percent say its unfair that under the Mas-
sachusetts no-fault insurance system neither the driver at fault in an accident
nor his insurance company would have to pay for any of their losses. Also, 77
percent say that they would favor a system whereby the driver or his insurance
company would be required to pay damages in proportion to the degree of
fault of the driver in causing the accident. These are among the highlights
of a recent survey conducted by Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton,
New Jersey.
Among the injured in the survey sample, this is the disposition of their
claims:
Total Injured = 100%
Didn't file claim 34%
Filed but not settled 25
Settled and satisfied 28
Settled, not satisfied 11
Settled, uncertain 2
Among those accidents occurring from January through June, 1971, (68 percent
of all injured in the survey), 32 percent of those filing a claim report that a
settlement has not yet been made.
When given a test accident situation in which a car going in the opposite
direction crosses over into the respondent's lane and crashes into him causing
injury, 91 percent say that the driver at fault or his insurance company should
have to pay for any disability or loss of some part of the body; 91 percent
feel the driver at fault or his insurance company should pay for damage to
the car; 89 percent think that the driver at fault or his insurance company
should pay for time lost from work and medical expenses.
The Massachusetts accident victims were asked, "When the Massachusetts no-
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The proponents of no-fault have repeatedly claimed that there is a grass-
roots public clamor for no-fault. This claim has been refuted by the voters
fault auto insurance law went into effect last January, did the overall cost of
your auto insurance go up, go down or stay the same?" Twenty-eight per
cent say their rates went up, 6 percent say they went down, 44 percent say
they stayed the same, and 22 percent indicate they don't know.
The results of this survey were obtained by telephone interviews among 502
residents of Massachusetts who were involved in automobile accidents during
the time that the Massachusetts no-fault insurance law has been in effect.
The interviews were conducted during the period November 29 through De-
cember 19, 1971. Following are the actual questions asked and their results.
"Did you file a claim for your injuries with (your) (your driver's) insurance
company?"
"Has your claim been settled yet?"
"Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the amount of the settlement?"
Total Injured 100%
Didn't file claim 34%
Filed but not settled 25
Settled and satisfied 28
Settled, not satisfied 11
Settled, uncertain 2
The following are based on all 502 respondents.
"When the Massachusetts no-fault auto insurance law went into effect last
January, did the overall cost of your auto insurance go up, go down or stay
about the same?"
1 WENT UP 28%
2 WENT DOWN 6
3 STAYED SAME 44
4 DON'T KNOW 22
I'd like your views on this auto accident case: Suppose you are driving
within the speed limit on the right side of the road. A car coming in the
opposite direction crosses over into your lane and crashes into your car and
you are injured.
"Who would be at fault, you or the other driver?"
I ME 1%
2 OTHER DRIVER 95
3 DON'T KNOW 4
"Do you think the other driver or his insurance company should or should
not have to pay for the damages to your car?"
1 SHOULD 91%
2 SHOULD NOT 2
3 NO OPINION 7
"Do you think the other driver or his insurance company should or should
not have to pay any time lost from your work and your medical expenses?"
1 SHOULD 89%
2 SHOULD NOT 5
3 NO OPINION 6
"If you were disabled in the accident and lost the use of some part of your
body, do you think the other driver or his insurance company should or
should not have to pay reasonable compensation for your disability?"
1 SHOULD 91%
2 SHOULD NOT 2
3 NO OPINION 7
"In the accident I just described, under the Massachusetts no-fault insurance
system ordinarily neither the other driver nor his insurance company would
have to pay for any of your losses; your own insurance company would be
[Vol. 22:746
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of Colorado, who, as part of the November 1972 election, were asked to adopt
no-fault by a referendum measure. The voters overwhelmingly rejected no-
fault by a 3-1 margin. 73
IV. Massachusetts--Success or Failure
Much has been written about the experience in Massachusetts, especially
about the rate reductions which have allegedly occurred in that state. In
this part, we shall endeavor to illuminate this area and to separate fact from
fiction.
Have overall costs really been reduced? For a substantial number of mo-
torists--especially those who seek fuller protection for property damage-
overall costs have risen. This can be illustrated by comparing the premiums
paid by a Class 1074 Boston driver who insured a new Chevrolet Impala in
1970 under the tort system with the premiums to be paid by such a driver for
a new Chevrolet Impala in 1972 under no-fault. In this example, the overall




Bodily Injury $117 $ 74
10/20 Coverage 26 22
Property Damage 49 21
Med. Pay 15 9
Uninsured Motorists 2 2
Collision ($100 deductible) 161 294
Total ...... $496 $555
Proponents of no-fault proposals attempt to justify the increase by con-
tending that it was caused by inflationary factors. This argument loses
sight of the fact that insurers in other states, operating under the fault
responsible for only medical expenses and wage losses up to a maximum of
$2,000. Do you think this is fair or unfair?"
1 FAIR 23%
2 UNFAIR 62
3 NO OPINION 15
"Would you favor or oppose an auto insurance system where the other driver
or his insurance company would have to pay damages in proportion to the
degree of fault of the driver in causing an accident?"
1 FAVOR 77%
2 OPPOSE 10
3 NO OPINION 13
73. See Denver Post, November 9, 1972, at 1.
74. A Class 10 driver is considered to be the best risk and hence pays the lowest
premium of those operating within the same geographical zone. The statutory basis
for such a classification is MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 113B (1972).
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system, have reduced rates. Furthermore, the Massachusetts experience is to
be sharply contrasted with the successful, but less publicized, results oc-
curring in Oregon and Delaware under those states' sound and construc-
tive no-fault laws. Information released by the Insurance Commissioner of
Oregon concerning the rates charged by four leading insurers in that State
reveals that the overall cost of insurance has remained just about the same,
despite the passage of a no-fault law, which provides about five times greater
no-fault benefits than does the Massachusetts law.7 5
The alleged 27.6 percent reduction of the personal injury premium may not
be applicable to many motorists because 276 out of 351 cities and towns in
Massachusetts were concurrently (with the alleged rate reduction) moved
up into higher cost rating territories. One source reported that for many
drivers it appeared the reduction in the personal injury premium would
really be only about 10 percent. 76
One of the criticisms of proponents of no-fault against the tort system is
that victims allegedly receive a small percentage of the personal injury pre-
mium dollar. Yet, figures prepared by the Massachusetts Automobile Rating
and Accident Prevention Bureau reveal that under the tort system the
premiums for compulsory personal injury coverage totaled $130,633,902 and
the losses incurred-the benefits paid-totaled $99,192,618, whereas un-
der no-fault the premiums totaled $111,218,794 and the losses incurred
totaled $48,877,585. This means that under, the tort system, companies
allocated 76 percent of the premiums collected to the payment of benefits
to accident victims, and that under no-fault less than 44 percent of the pre-
miums are used for this purpose. In other words, accident victims appear to
have received less of the premium dollar under no-fault than they did under
the tort system. In addition, even if personal injury rates are reduced by
27.6 percent, only 63 percent of the premium paid will be devoted to the
payment of benefits as contrasted with 76 percent under the tort system.
Furthermore, figures released by the Massachusetts Department of Insur-
ance to the press allege a 34 percent reduction in the number of claims. 77
The soundness of any system which pays fewer people, while reducing the
flow of benefits to accident victims, must be held in question.78
There is still the question of how much of the alleged rate reduction is at-
75. Editorial, No-Fault: Change in The Wind, 8 TRIAL 34 (Mar./Apr., 1972).
76. Boston Record American, Dec. 15, 1971, at 3, col. 4.
77. Boston Herald Traveler & Record American, Aug. 3, 1972, at 3, col. 5.
78. Paradoxically, a phenomenon has been discovered in Massachusetts known as
the "vanishing claimant." A study reveals a reduction of 50,000 in total claims
under no-fault. ". . . the vanishing claimants appear to be the innocent victims of
negligent motorists." Brainard, The Impact of No-Fault on The Underwriting Re-
sults of Massachusetts Insurers, 44 Miss. L.J. 174, 179 (1973).
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tributable to no-fault. There is evidence in the Insurance Commissioner's or-
der setting the rates and from other sources around the country that per-
sonal injury rates would have been reduced even under the tort system. Due
to the cumulative impact of improved safety features in cars (which reduce
the frequency and severity of accidents) insurers in "fault" states have re-
duced rates. 79 It is interesting to note that, while the common law tort sys-
tem was still in effect, the Commissioner relied to a great extent upon the 1970
experience in establishing rates for 1972. He specifically relied upon the re-
duction in claims frequency between 1966 and 1970. The Commissioner
took investment income into consideration in setting the rates and disallowed
a profit allowance of 5 percent and allowed only one percent. It is quite
possible that as much as 50 percent of the alleged reduction can be attributed
to factors having nothing to do with no-fault. 80 The balance of the reduc-
tion is attributable to the substantial divestiture of benefits which occurs un-
der no-fault and which results in an increase, rather than a decrease, in
the true cost of insurance.
To compute the true cost of insurance, one must compare the dollars
paid for the insurance with the benefits realized from the insurance system.
Under the tort system, almost two-thirds of the Massachusetts market paid
less than $65 for personal injury protection and the average premium paid
by this substantial majority of the motoring public was $42.81 Assume that
such an average motorist was involved in an accident and that under the
tort system he would have recovered a settlement or verdict of $840. His
cost-benefits ratio would have been 20 to 1. Based upon statistics compiled
by the Department of Transportation, no-fault will result in close to 80
percent of the deserving accident victims losing 78 percent of the benefits
they would have received under the tort system.8 2 Hence, the average de-
serving accident victim will receive only $184.80 under no-fault as contrasted
with a recovery of $840 under the tort system. The average motorist's
cost-benefits ratio has been sharply reduced from 20 to 1, to about 7 to 1.
The cheapest form of life insurance would be one which provides no death
benefits. This is exactly what has occurred under the alleged rate reduc-
tion. The true costs for personal injury protection have really risen.
It should be noted that the above figures tend to be conservative in their
estimation of the reduction of benefits under no-fault. A recent study by the
79. Wall Street Journal, May 28, 1971, at 1, col. 6. See also TIME MAGAZINE,
August 23, 1971, p. 51.
80. This projection is predicated upon the reductions which have occurred else-
where (caused primarily by the impact of safety) and the consideration of investment
income in setting rates.
81. Brainard, Prices and Politics, 6 TRIAL 24 (Oct./Nov.,1970).
82. PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 50.
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Jury Verdict Research Project reveals that in an average no-fault case in
which damages for pain and suffering are denied, an injured person could
expect to receive only 15.8 percent of what a jury would have awarded.83
Now given that there have been rate reductions in Massachusetts, have they
been equitable ones? Pure premium, which is based upon average cost,
is a product of the sum of "frequency of claims" times "severity of loss". The
average cost can be cut only by reducing one or both of these variables. No-
fault will not necessarily reduce the frequency of claims. In fact, in setting
1972 rates, the Commissioner projected a 20 percent increase in claims un-
der no-fault. No-fault can reduce rates only by affecting the second variable
-the Severity of Loss factor-and it does so by reducing or eliminating the
benefits which are paid out to a large number of people. Note, however,
who suffers and benefits under this approach. The prudent and responsi-
ble good risk, the average driver who previously paid a personal injury pre-
mium of $42 under the tort system, finds that his personal injury premium
has been reduced (even after all rate reductions go into effect) by only $16
and that, for this $16 savings, he is giving up 78 percent of his benefits. On
the other hand, the high risk driver has had his rate reduced by $82. The
high risk driver is no more prudent than he previously was and hence there
is no justification for a reduction in his rates. The only rationale for the re-
duction is that the good risk driver is subsidizing the bad risk. This subsidy
takes the form of a reduction and elimination of benefits to the good risk
driver.84
Does no-fault give greater protection to property interests than to human
rights and losses? In the example of the hypothetical Boston Impala
owner, approximately 32 percent of the total premium dollar covered per-
sonal injury and 68 percent covered property damage under the tort sys-
tem. In 1972, only 23-24 percent of the total premium dollar will cover per-
sonal injury. Two inferences may be drawn from these statistics. First of
all, no-fault unfortunately gives greater protection to bumpers and fenders
than to human losses. Second, it highlights the fact that the property portion
of the premium dollar is more expensive since the insured receives more
benefits for his money than under the personal injury coverage. This fur-
ther emphasizes the fact that the alleged dramatic reduction in benefits
which occurs under no-fault results in an actual rise in the true costs of in-
surance.
83. Jury Verdict Research Project, supra note 48.





Ill and hastily conceived no-fault panaceas pose a clear and present dan-
ger to the rights of the public. The alleged advantages of faulty no-fault
plans can be achieved only at a terrible and unnecessary price. It is this ar-
ticle's thesis that all of these alleged advantages can be achieved without
subjecting the injured person to the evils and disadvantages of faulty no-
fault.
In a quest for constructive improvements of the current system, legislators
should be guided by the responsible no-fault laws enacted in Maryland,
South Dakota, Oregon, Arkansas, and Delaware. These states are vivid illus-
trations of the feasibility of evolving no-fault systems which provide injured
persons with prompt and automatic payment for economic losses, while pre-
serving the rights of deserving accident victims to recover full and fair com-
pensation for all of their losses.
Meaningful reform of the automobile accident reparation system man-
dates the implementation of other innovations. The major elements of re-
sponsible reform are as follows:
(1) To facilitate a reduction in auto insurance rates, there should be strict
governmental regulation and scrutiny of the automobile insurance indus-
try, insurance rates, and insurance practices.
(2) Rates can be further reduced by a requirement that the regulatory
agencies consider the investment income and profits of insurers and their
conglomerate-related business ventures when rates are set. In the majority
of cases, investment income of insurers far exceeds the "profit" derived from
the successful running of an insurance business. In addition, any loss in
the "claims" operation serves as a tax "write-off" against investment in-
come. Furthermore, "investment income" is taxed at approximately one-
seventh the rate of "ordinary income."
The magnitude of investment income can be gleaned from a report that a
single nationwide stock company had investments valued at $1.6 billion at
the end of 1967 and that, in the year 1965, the total gain from investments
by all stock companies was approximately $1.6 billion.8 5 Meaningful leg-
islation in this area should require that rates be reduced beacuse of the prof-
its realized from investment income.
(3) No-faulters claim that the seriously injured - those with economic
losses in excess of $25,000 - are inadequately compensated under the cur-
rent system. The primary rationale for the plight of these persons, accord-
ing to the Department of Transportation, is the presence of low insurance
85. Schwartz, Book Review, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1278, 1283, 1284 (1968).
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limits. For example, the most frequently found coverage limit for automobile
bodily injury liability insurance (about 30 percent of all policies) is $10,000/
$20,000.86
Meaningful reform plans could insure adequate compensation for accident
victims by requiring higher and more realistic minimum limits. There should
also be required uninsured motorist coverage in similar, higher amounts.
It should allow every motorist to protect himself against the uninsured and
underinsured driver up to the liability limits of his own policy.
(4) Insurance companies should be prohibited from cancelling and
refusing to renew insurance policies and from arbitrarily rejecting applica-
tions for insurance.
(5) An independent public consumer advocate should be appointed to
protect the interests of the consumer in matters bearing on motor vehicle
insurance. This ombudsman should be authorized to receive and act upon
complaints from the public, legislatures, or executive agencies regarding ac-
tions of insurers and regulatory agencies.
(6) In the event of an accident, the economic losses of at least 96 percent
of the accident victims should be paid in full, promptly and without the ne-
cessity of proving fault.87  However, deserving accident victims should be
able to recover general damages by bringing a tort action. Payments to
victims would also be accelerated by encouraging advance payments by in-
surers. 88
(7) Manufacturers should have to produce safer, durable, and more
crashworthy cars which can be driven into a test barrier at a speed of ten miles
per hour without sustaining any damage. It has been estimated that this
will reduce physical damage to autos by 60 percent to 85 percent.8 9 Since
two-thirds of the premium dollar pays for property coverage, this essential
element will dramatically reduce insurance rates.
(8) Unsafe drivers, including the alcoholic and the drug addict, should be
removed from the road.
(9) A Department of Transportation Study reveals that the single largest
complaint of auto insurance consumers relates to the denial of coverage by
86. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 18.
87. 96.3 percent of the accident victims sustain economic losses which do not
exceed $2,500. See PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 50 (1970). Thus, a constructive no-
fault plan which provided first-party benefits for medical expenses and wage losses to
an aggregate limit of $2,500 would pay the economic losses, in full, of 96.3 percent of
all the accident victims. It is the author's thesis that this can be accomplished without
impairing the tort remedy.
88. See Lemmon, Ingredients for Reform, 6 TRIAL 56, 58 (Oct./Nov., 1970). Al-
though it is a relatively new procedure, 19 percent of those eligible do receive some
form of advanced payment. See PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 120 (1970).
89. See supra note 45.
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the insurer.00 This problem could be ameliorated by outlawing harsh and
outmoded rules including governmental tort immunity, 91 family immunity, -92
guest statutes,93 and contributory negligence 94 (which should be replaced by
comparative negligence).
(10) Court congestion and delay may be a problem in some metropolitan
areas of the country. This problem could be alleviated by providing for
arbitration of small claims with the right to a trial de novo being preserved.
(11) The subrogation of property claims should be eliminated. "Subro-
gation ends up with the companies passing the same money back and forth,
after jamming the courts all the more and running up litigation costs."9 5
Public opinion polls reveal that the overwhelming majority of our citizenry
favor the retention of the fault principle and the right to recover for human
losses, including pain and suffering, and earning capacity. There is an old
maxim, "Walk away from the people and you walk into the night." In this
age of consumerism, faulty no-fault must be avoided since it will cast con-
sumers into the darkness of an era when industry was king. The law
must favor responsible reforms which put the consumer back in the driver's
seat.
90. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS IN SELECTED
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE MARKETS 10 (1970).
91. See Sovereign Immunity and Public Responsibility, 1966 U. ILL. L. FORUM No.
4 (Winter Symposium Issue); Comment, 32 ATL. L.J. 284-293 (1968).
92. See Recent Development, Interspousal Immunity-Time for a Reappraisal, 27
OHIO ST. L.J. 550 (1966); W. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILLANOVA
L. REV. 521 (1960); H. Kalven, Tort Law-Negligence on the Move, 33 ATL. L.J. 1,
13-23 (1970).
93. See W. Pedrick, Taken For a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of
Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 90 (1961); S. V. Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U.
FLA. REV. 287 (1958); E. Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them, 9
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1 (1968).
94. See W. Schwartz, Pure Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 ATL. L.J. 117
(1972); COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MONOGRAPH (W. SCHWARTZ ed., 1970); C. HEFT
AND J. HEFr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1971).
95. Pitkin, The Dilemmas of Auto Insurance, TiE LEGION MAGAZINE 8, 48 (April
1969).
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